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Presented  at the Dec. 10 2012  
FTC/DOJ Workshop on PAEs,  
with slide 24 added for context  
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There are many ways to view patent assertion entities 
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Justice Kennedy: “firms [that] use patents not 
as a basis for producing and selling goods but, 
instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.” 
 
What is a patent assertion entity?  
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FTC/Chien: an “entity that uses patents primarily 
to obtain license fees rather than to support the 
development or transfer of technology.” 
 
What is a patent assertion entity?  
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An entity that asserts patents on existing 
products as a business model 
 
 
What is a patent assertion entity?  
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Non-Practicing Entity Types 
 
  Universities 
Startups 
Inventor 
Monetizers 
 
(Non-Practicing  
Corporate Monetizers) 
Special Purpose 
Patent Monetizers 
PAEs 
Asserting  patents on existing products as a business 
model distinguishes PAEs from other types of NPEs 
Non-Practicing  
Defensive Aggregators 
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Why is the PAE business model interesting? 
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Traditional patent litigation economics are stacked 
against enforcement 
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Traditional patent litigation economics are stacked against 
enforcement 
Cost of
Defense
Cost of
Assertion
Judgment/
Settlement
Direct Costs 
Its Expensive to Bring a Patent  Lawsuit 
? 
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Traditional patent litigation economics are stacked against 
enforcement 
Cost of
Defense
Cost of
Assertion
Judgment/
Settlement
Indirect Costs 
Countersuit 
Reputation 
Disruption 
Direct Costs 
It’s Risky to Bring a Patent Lawsuit 
? 
REVENUE   =  LOSS COST > 
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These high costs and risks lead to the nonenforcement of 
patents 
? 
~250K estimated 
patents 
Only a tiny 
fraction is 
enforced 
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PAEs fundamentally change the economics of patent 
enforcement 
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Reputation 
Disruption 
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? 
PAEs don’t make anything and can’t be countersued, 
disrupted, or impugned  
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PAEs use contingent fee lawyers 
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Lawyers (75%) 
Costs (25%) 
? 
PAEs use contingent fee lawyers 
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Cost of
Defense
Cost of
Assertion
Judgment/
Settlement
Direct Costs 
Lawyers (75%) 
Costs (25%) 
? 
PAEs use contingent fee lawyers and assert the same patents 
in the same venues to capture economies of scale 
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Cost of
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Cost of
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Judgment/
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? 
PAEs make it economical to bring suit, and economical for the 
defendant to settle, regardless of the merits 
 Settlement 
Nuisance 
Fee Model 
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Cost of
Defense
Cost of
Assertion
Judgment/
Settlement
? 
PAEs make it economical to bring suit, and economical for the 
defendant to settle, regardless of the merits 
 Settlement 
Nuisance  
Lottery 
Fee Model 
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Don’t Call them Trolls 
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What is patent assertion? 
A pathbreaking, disruptive technology for  
monetizing patents that eliminates traditional  
obstacles to enforcement  [and give the little guy  
a chance!] 
What is patent assertion? 
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What is patent assertion? 
A pathbreaking, legal disruptive technology for  
monetizing patents that eliminates traditional  
obstacles to enforcement 
What is patent assertion? 
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2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 - Dec 1
PAE Suits as Share of Total Patent Infringement Suits 
Source: RPX Research and PACER. Includes suits filed through 12/1/2012 
569 
606 622 731 
731 
1509 
2544 
61% 
45% 
29% 27% 25% 23% 19% 
This year, PAEs have brought the majority (61%) of 
patent lawsuits – 2,530 through December 1  
Note to media: please do not report this slide without looking at the next one 
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Source: RPX Research and PACER. Includes suits filed through 12/1/2012 
19% 
This slide added for context on Dec 11 and presented previously at Georgetown on November 2 – 
shows that despite more PAE suits, the number of defendants has gone down. Both are likely due to 
the AIA misjoinder rules – its harder to name more defendants per suit, requiring PAEs to split their 
suits up and making it “not worth it” to sue smaller companies. We don’t know if total assertions are 
net up or down, bc many demands are made for each suit (see slide 26). 
The 61% of new suits 
actually represents a 
decline in the 
number of 
defendants named, 
from a 2011 high. 
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What is patent assertion? 
A pathbreaking, disruptive legal technology for  
monetizing patents that eliminates traditional  
obstacles to suit 
 
That represents the majority of new patent cases 
What is patent assertion? 
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How many demands are brought for every suit? 
What is the Ratio of Demands to Suits? 
 
25-50:1 – estimate of high end sell-side patent broker 
 
307:1 – Cisco et al v. Innovatio, Case No. 1:11-cv-09308, Lex 
Machina (8,000+ letters, 26 cases) 
 
For every lawsuit, many demands are made 
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How many demands are brought for every suit? 
What is the Ratio of Demands to Suits? 
 
25-50:1 – estimate of high end sell-side patent broker 
 
307:1 – Cisco et al v. Innovatio, Case No. 1:11-cv-09308, Lex 
Machina (8,000+ letters, 26 cases) 
 
We don’t know exactly what’s happening but it’s 
likely that…. 
Most patent fights are 
not conducted in public 
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Public cases and private demands are often resolved 
under NDA 
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What is patent assertion? 
A pathbreaking, disruptive legal technology for  
monetizing patents that eliminates traditional  
obstacles to suit 
 
That represents the majority of new patent cases 
 
About which we don’t really understand the  
consequences, good or bad 
What is patent assertion? 
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Now that we now what we are talking about… 
No. It’s an elephant 
Now that we know what we are talking about 
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Now that we now what we are talking about… 
This view 
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Now that we now what we are talking about… 
This view is empirical and descriptive, but motivated 
by policy concerns 
Datasources 
Literature, 
Survey and Interview  
Subjects 
Open database of 100K+ startups and tech 
companies 
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RPX Data vs. Lex Machina/Feldman 2012 Data 
On Average, 
RPX = +1% 
23% 
25% 
27% 
29% 
45% 
22% 
25% 
30% 
27% 
40% 
0%
20%
40%
60%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
RPX PAEs
Lex Machina/
Feldman PMEs
See also RPX v. Chien 2009  (943 codings compared), reported in Chien 2012, Startups  
and  Patent Trolls (finding RPX = +4% PAEs) 
 
RPX Data is on average within 1% vs. Lex Machina/Feldman 
2012 coding for the GAO 
34  
Click to edit footnote or “Source” text styles 
This Talk 
1. Economics/Business Models of Patent 
Assertion 
 
2. Case Study: Harms/Benefits to Startups  
 
3. Policy Issues 
 
4. Monitoring/Research Agenda 
 
This Presentation 
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This Talk This Presentation 
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This Talk 
1. Economics/Business Models of Patent 
Assertion 
 
2. Case Study: Harms/Benefits to Startups  
 
3. Policy Issues 
 
4. Monitoring/Research Agenda 
 
This Presentation 
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PAEs capture economies of scale, over multiple defendants 
and campaigns 
Buy/Build  
Asset 
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Cost 
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Assertion 
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Assertion 
Campaign  
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Cost of  
Acquisition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Financing/ 
Legal Costs 
 
 
 
 
Settlements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Settlements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assertion 
Campaign  
3 
Settlements 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample PAE Business Plan 
The business model is risky – you may never get your investment back. 
Marginal Cost of Assertion  
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Cost of
Defense
Cost of
Assertion
Judgment/
Settlement
Direct Costs 
? 
PAEs capture economies of scale, over multiple defendants 
and campaigns 
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Distribution of “Serial PAEs” by Defendants Named  
(Jan 1, 2011 – Dec 1, 2012) 
Serial PAEs have named more than 15 defendants in more than 1 suit, Aggressive Repeating Inventors have named more than 15 defendants in 
more than 1 suit 
Non Repeat 
Inventors 
5% 
Serial Inventors 
3% 
Non Repeat PAEs 
19% 
Serial PAEs 
73% 
The majority (76%) of PAE defendants are sued by a PAE that 
has named 15+ defendants over 2 or more suits 
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$100M 
Although suits against large tech companies get the most 
attention, defendants revenue/industry profiles vary widely 
3 Litigations/Year 
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Two Kinds of Hold-up There are several drivers of settlement 
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Remedies-Driven Holdup 
“[When] the Sword of Damocles of a 
jury verdict or [an] ITC injunction 
hanging over their heads.” 
  
Contingent Fee Lawyer Interviewee; David Schwartz, 
The Rise of Contingent Fee Lawyer Representation in 
Patent Law, __ Ala. Law Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2012) 
 
See Shapiro and Lemley 2007 
? 
Economic Value/Remedies-Driven Settlement 
 
Settlement driven by how much it would cost to switch out  
the technology (injunction) or what a court might award in 
damages 
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Cost of Defense-Driven Holdup 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chien 2012, Reforming Software Patents 
Cost of Defense-Driven Settlement 
 
Settlement driven by the cost of defense 
 
When it’s cheaper to fold than fight 
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This Talk 
1. Economics/Business Models of Patent 
Assertion 
 
2. Case Study: Harms/Benefits to Startups  
 
3. Policy Issues 
 
4. Monitoring/Research Agenda 
 
This Presentation 
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Why Startups Matter 
Credit: John Haltiwanger 
Why Startups Matter: from 2003-2007 they created more new 
jobs  than other firms in the private sector 
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Why Startups Matter  
Haltiwanger et. al, Job Creation, Worker Churning, and Wages 
at Young Businesses (November 2012) 
“Four out of every 10 hires at young 
firms are for newly created 
jobs, much higher than in older firms, 
where the ratio fluctuates between 0.25 
and 0.33”  
Startups create new jobs, but they also change course/fail at a 
high rate, shedding assets like patents 
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Why Startups Matter  How are PAEs benefiting small companies? 
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How are startups benefiting from patent NPE/PAE buy and litigate the patents of small companies 
($200M) more than the patents of others 
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4% of 223 nonrandom survey respondents reported that 
they had monetized their patents, with another 20% 
saying that they had considered it.  
 
 
Chien 2012, Startups & Patent Trolls 
Some startups are interested in monetizing their patents 
(although unclear if PAE v. ex ante transfer) 
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Why Startups Matter  How are PAEs harming small companies? 
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$10M 
At least 55% of unique  
defendants have less than  
$10M in revenue and 66% 
have less than $100M 
The majority of PAE defendants (at least 55%) have less than 
$10M in revenue 
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Why are small companies being sued? Why are small companies being sued? 
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How often are tech startups sued? 
N= ~ 200 per category. Based on author analysis of ~1600 companies in Crunchbase 
and Lex Machina litigation records.  
0%
20%
40%
60%
0 $1-1M $1M-5M $5M-10M $10M-20M $20M-50M $50-500M
% of Companies Sued (By Funds Raised) 
The more funding a startup gets, the more likely it is to be 
sued.  
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Chien 2012, Startups & Patent Trolls 
Some startups are harmed by PAE demands. More than a 
nuisance. 
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We don’t really know the net benefits or costs 
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This Talk This Presentation 
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This Talk 
1. Economics/Business Models of Patent 
Assertion 
 
2. Case Study: Harms/Benefits to Startups  
 
3. Policy Issues 
 
4. Monitoring/Research Agenda 
 
This Presentation 
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Before PAEs: widespread nonenforcement of patents 
 
? 
~250K estimated 
patents 
Only a tiny 
fraction is 
enforced 
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Cost of
Defense
Cost of
Assertion
Judgment/
Settlement
? 
After PAEs: it can be economical to bring, and to settle suits, 
regardless of the merits 
 Settlement 
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What are the pros and cons of rapidly increasing 
enforcement? 
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Before PAEs: widespread nonenforcement of patents 
 
? 
~250K estimated 
patents 
Only a tiny 
fraction is 
enforced 
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Patent is enforced 
 
 
I get to have the feature 
Patent is practiced, not enforced 
 
 
We all get to have the feature, 
in all different forms and prices. 
 
  
 
Hooray for Competition! 
But widespread infringement has pro-competitive benefits 
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Courtroom 
 
Freedom to litigate 
 
Great patents 
 
Great lawyers 
 
Marketplace 
 
Freedom to innovate 
 
Great products 
 
Great marketing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources of  Competitive Advantage 
When companies can’t win in the courtroom, they 
must compete in the marketplace 
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How are startups benefiting from patent But PAEs give the little guy a chance and create a demand for 
their patents – this should increase innovation 
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How are startups benefiting from patent PAEs are increasing the velocity of transfers between buyers 
and sellers of patent rights 
66  
Repeat litigants dominate these transfers. 61% of 
defendants were sued by a PAE who had sued 8+ times. 
PAE Plaintiff Type by Number of Defendants Named: Jan 1, 2011 – Dec 1, 2012 
Repeat Litigant PAEs have named more than 15 defendants in more than 7 suit, Aggressive Repeating Inventors have named more than 15 
defendants in more than 7 suit 
Non Repeat 
Inventors 
23% 
Repeat Litigant (8+ 
lawsuits) Inventors 
1% 
Non Repeat PAEs 
16% 
Repeat Litigant (8+ 
lawsuits) PAEs 
60% 
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Allison et al 2011 found that the most asserted software 
patents (8+ cases) – lose in court roughly 90% of the time 
PAE Plaintiff Type by Number of Defendants Named: Jan 1, 2011 – Dec 1, 2012 
Repeat Litigant PAEs have named more than 15 defendants in more than 7 suit, Aggressive Repeating Inventors have named more than 15 
defendants in more than 7 suit 
Non Repeat 
Inventors 
23% 
Repeat Litigant (8+ 
lawsuits) Inventors 
1% 
Non Repeat PAEs 
16% 
Repeat Litigant (8+ 
lawsuits) PAEs 
60% 
Are these transfers 
legitimate? 
68  
How efficient are the transfers between buyers and sellers of 
technology? (survey data) 
69  
Based on 900 litigations, in the majority of them, the 
legal costs exceed the settlement  
RPX Survey of 78 companies with 900 resolved NPE litigations.  Legal cost includes outside counsel (lead, local, and re-exam), experts, 
discovery, prior art searching, jury consultants, graphics, and other related costs. Excludes in-house legal costs. Settlement and judgment costs  
may include the estimated present value of running royalties.  NPEs include PAEs (Patent assertion entities believed to earn revenue 
predominantly through licensing of patents), universities and research institutions, individual inventors, and select operating companies asserting 
patents well outside their area of product or services.  The very vast majority of the data underlying this analysis reflects litigation with PAEs. 
96% 
69% 
53% 
47% 
13% 
4% 
31% 
47% 
53% 
87% 
$0-10K $10K-100K $100K-1M $1M-10M $10M+
Settlement or 
judgment cost 
Legal cost 
Total defendant cost to resolve matter 
(legal + settlement/judgment) 
90% 
10% 
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What reforms are possible? 
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Remedies-Driven Holdup Non-ITC Judicial remedies reforms have reduced the 
injunction rate and made proving damages more expensive 
Ebay and its Progeny 
Causal Nexus 
Uniloc, 
LaserDynamics, 
Lucent 
Posner 
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Remedies-Driven Holdup Other reforms are aimed at reducing the cost of defense and 
increasing the cost of assertion 
Misjoinder Rules 
 
Post Grant Review 
e-Discovery Reform 
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One-way fee shifting could dramatically change courtoom 
economics and contingent representation  
Fee-Shifting 
 
But the past has shown it to be less 
useful against: 
- Repeat players (but most PAEs are) 
- Judgment proof parties (but many 
PAEs are) 
- Cases that don’t go to judgment (only 
5% of cases do) 
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How many demands are brought for every suit? 
What is the Ratio of Demands to Suits? 
 
25-50:1 – estimate of high end sell-side patent broker 
 
307:1 – Cisco et al v. Innovatio, Case No. 1:11-cv-09308, Lex 
Machina (8,000+ letters, 26 cases) 
 
Also, need to worry about presuit dynamic 
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What about market-based ways of reducing the cost of 
defense? 
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What about market-based ways of reducing the cost of 
defense? 
Group Defense  
Non-Settlement Policy 
Insurance 
Defense Contigency  
Self-Help 
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What about market-based ways of reducing the cost of 
defense? 
Group Defense  
Non-Settlement Policy 
Insurance 
Defense Contigency  
Self-Help 
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How many demands are brought for every suit? 
These approaches have been used before 
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How many demands are brought for every suit? 
In the late 1880s, railroads, under patent attack in a manner similar to tech 
companies today formed Associations that mounted… 
Steve Usselman, Patents Purloined 1991 
See also Chien, Reforming Software Patents 2012 
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How many demands are brought for every suit? It worked! (combine and overcome v. divide and conquer) 
  
Steve Usselman, Patents Purloined 1991 
See also Chien, Reforming Software Patents 2012 
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How many demands are brought for every suit? The competition authorities had a role 
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How many demands are brought for every suit? 
So, where does that leave us? 
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This Talk 
4. Monitoring/Research Agenda 
 
This Presentation 
 
“To understand 
God's thoughts we 
must study 
statistics” 
 
-Florence 
Nightingale  
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More research is needed to understand the positive 
and negative impacts 
What have small companies done with the money?  
(What cut did they get?) 
 
What is the nature of the negative impacts? 
 
What has been the impact on innovation 
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Research/Monitoring Agenda 
“Everything that can 
be counted does not 
necessarily count; 
everything that 
counts cannot 
necessarily be 
counted.”  
Comprehensive Case Studies 
Monitor movements in the market 
See if legal/market reforms work 
Qualitative, quantitative, and historical approaches could all be  
useful 
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